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PRECEDENT AND JUDICIAL POWER AFTER
THE FOUNDING
POLL' I PRICE*
Abstract: A recent decision by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit enlivened the controversy over court rules that prevent
citation to unpublished opinions when it held that the Circuit's non-
citation rule violates Article III of the United States Constitution. This
Article affirms the view that judicial power includes a doctrine of
precedent, without relying solely upon an originalist interpretation of
Article HI. This approach identifies a consistent "core idea" of
precedent that courts must consider how a similar case was decided in
the past, even where there are varying ideas about the binding nature of
that precedent. A long-standing tradition has viewed precedent as a
necessary starting point for judicial decision. When a court departs
from this core idea, it violates the essential function of the judiciary to
treat like cases alike or explain the difference.
Like a phoenix rising from the ashes of modern legal theory, re-
spect for precedent is poised for a comeback. The evidence is Anasta-
soff v. United States 1 --an opinion from the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals that created shockwaves when it invalidated that court's rule
against citation of unpublished opinions. Anastasoff announced that
the United States Constitution imposes some obligation on federal
courts to respect precedent, an obligation that is inconsistent with the
current practice of many federal and state courts to consider -unpub-
lished opinions to hold no precedential value. This is not a minor is-
sue. In 1999, nearly eighty percent of all federal appellate cases fell
into this "not for official publication" category. 2 Because in most fed-
* Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law.J.D., Harvard Law School; BA.,
M.A., Emory University. The author was a law clerk for the lion. Richard S. Arnold, Eighth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, from 1989-1991. Thanks to Thomas C. Arthur, David J.
Bederman, Harold J. Berman, Anita Bernstein, 0. Price Marshall Jr., and Robert Schapiro
for their helpful critiques of earlier drafts, and to Susan I. Jackson, a student at Emory Law
School, for sharing her research.
1 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot by No. 99—
3917E3,1, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33247 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (en bane).
2 United Stales Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Conn's: 1999 Annual Report of the Direc-
tor, Supplemental Tahle S-3, at 49, available al li11p://uww.uscourts.gov/judlms1999/
supps.litinl (last visited Jan. 7, 2001) [hereinafter judiciai Ba.sine.ss}.
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eral circuits an unpublished opinion is not precedent and may not be
cited, this means that less than a quarter of all judicial work in the
federal circuits in that year became "precedent" for future cases.
Anastasoff rejected the idea that, while hiding behind these rules,
courts may decide issues of law one way one year and another way the
next year, without explaining the difference.
Perhaps, though, the return of the precedent phoenix is not so
startling after all. Legal scholars for some time have suggested that
restrictions on publication and citation of court opinions are prob-
lematic, although no one seems to have argued that Article III poses a
constitutional problems If "precedent" is simply the record of how
previous cases were decided (so the argument goes), and courts are
indeed bound by precedent, then how can a court mandate that what
it has decided in the past is not precedent?4
Writing for the three-judge panel in Anastasoff Judge Richard S.
Arnold reasoned that the portion of the rule which declares that "un-
published opinions are not precedent" is an unconstitutional exten-
sion of the judicial power described in Article III of the United States
Constitution. For the federal courts, according to Anastasoff, the tradi-
tional doctrine of precedent is a fundamental component of the no-
tion of judicial power. Because the doctrine of precedent is inherent
in the concept of judicial power, avoidance of precedent, at least
through non-citation rules, goes beyond the judicial power conferred
by Article 111. 5
 So far as I am aware, legal scholars have not pondered
the extent to which respect for precedent may have been enshrined in
the Framers' vision of Article III. Rather than engage modern legal
scholarship which locates the justification for the authority of prece-
3 See general)", e.g., JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS 93 (1996) ("Given that ... the
precedential importance of a decision lies not in what the court says but in what it decides,
why should courts forbid citation of any decisions?"); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal
Courts of Appeals Perish if Tluy Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and
Just b,
 Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Th reat!, 44 Am. U. L. REv. 757 (1995); Robert J. Mar-
tineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation ofJudicial Opinions: a Reassessment, 28 U. MICH.
,J.L. REFORM 119 (1994); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78
Cot.um. L. REA'. 1167 (1978).
4
 Some judges also have been critical of this practice. See, e.g., County of L.A. v. Kling,
474 U.S. 936, 940 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Tor, like a court of appeals that issues
an opinion that may not be printed or cited, this Court then engages in decisionmaking
without the discipline and accountability that the preparation of opinions requires.");
Nat'l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 172-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald,
J., separate statement).
5 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 898.
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dent on equitable or prudential grounds,6 Judge Arnold found the
doctrine of precedent to be rooted in the Constitution's conception
of judicial power, squarely grounding precedent in the fundamental
law authorizing federal courts in the United States. Apparently for the
first time, a federal court has found some constitutional obligation to
consider precedent.
Anastasoff has already garnered a great deal of attention, 7 some of
it critical. 8 In this article, I argue that Judge Arnold is right about the
core meaning of judicial power, even if it is not necessary to rely solely
upon an originalist interpretation of Article III to make this point. A
contrary result would mock the notion of equal justice under the law.
The issue is not about whether courts officially publish their opinions,
nor is there any requirement that judicial opinions in routine cases
must be longer than a single sentence or paragraph. Instead, Anasta-
soff is an affirmation of two values at stake in the work of appellate
Courts: transparency of judicial decisiontnaking, and treating like cases
alike.
I defend this position by considering two potential criticisms of
Anastasoff. The first is directed at the method of constitutional inter-
pretation used in Anastasoff. The court uses an historical method to
conclude that Article III was intended to impose some restraint on the
federal judiciary with respect to precedent. The second criticism tar-
gets the future effects or consequences of the holding. Specifically, it
questions whether Judge Arnold's interpretation of Article III and the
theory of precedent as mandatory impose restrictions on what courts
may do to deviate from precedent.
Intent is impossible to determine here, one might suggest, be-
cause the Framers said nothing specific about this understanding of
6 0n this point A/task/sof/cites Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. RED'. 571. 595-
602 (1987). Anaslasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 11.7. A related view is that the concept of the "ride of
law" makes respect for precedent "indispensable." Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 1991 J. Sur. Gr. DIS•. 13, 16 (1991),
7 In the two months following the opinion's publication, for example, several articles
appeared. See generally Sieve France, Right to Cite, 86 A.B.A. J. 24 (2000); Steve France, Un-
published Opinions: Swift En Banc Review Expected of Case Treating Unpublished Opinions as
Precedent, 69 U.S. L. WK. 2227 (Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter France, Unpublished Opinions];
William Glaberson, Unprecedented: Legal Shortcuts Run into Some Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2000, at 4-4; Kevin Livingston, 8th Circuit: Barring Citation of Unpublished Opinions Uncon-
stitutional, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENeER, Ang. 25, 2000, at 4.
8 See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Judge. Ignites Storm over Unpublished Opinions, FuLToN COUNTS'
DAILY REP., Sept. 5, 2000; Evan P. Schultz, Gone hunting: Judge Richard Arnold of the 8th Cir.
chit Has Thhen Aim at Unpublished Opinions, But Missed His Math, LEGAL -TIMES, Sept. 11,
2000, at 78.
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judicial power. In the absence of solid evidence of specific intent, one
might argue, a constitutional interpretation that stands solely on
"originalism" is a weak argument for invalidating non-citation rules.
This weakness, critics may argue, is demonstrated by historical evi-
dence tending to show a different understanding of judicial power,
which begs the question whether an originalist approach provides any
better method of interpretation than other possibilities. I will suggest
that the same result could be reached by according authoritative
weight to long-standing tradition.
Another potential problem with the originalist argument is that
some historians have located the beginning of a "strict" doctrine of
precedent only in the post-founding period. In English legal history it
has been said that the distinction between a line of similar cases as a
source of law, and the binding force of a single decision, was not fully
formed in England before the nineteenth century. 9
 For the United
States, it has also been claimed that courts in the nineteenth century
adhered to stare decisist° only loosely, and that prior cases were not,
"even nominally," ultimately binding." In fact, one scholar has
claimed that "we have never known the strict doctrine [of stare deci-
sis] in the United States" and that we have always had a "lax regard for
precedent. "12
As described in more detail below, the conclusions of these histo-
rians are not inconsistent with the core idea of precedent ascribed to
Article III. This core idea is simply that courts must start with their
own precedent, even if there are varying ideas about the binding na-
ture of that precedent. That core idea was not only clearly present at
the Founding, it has remained consistent over the course of American
9 See HAROLD BERMAN ET AL., THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 484 (5t11 ed. 1996)
(In the later 19th century for the first time there developed the rule that a holding by a
court in a [single] previous case is binding on the same court (or an inferior court) in a
similar case."); PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CommoN LAW 350 (5th ed.
1956); see also Frederick C. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Ciltical fears 1800-
1850, 3 Am.], LEGAL MST, 28, 30 n.4 (1959).
'° Stare decisis is commonly used to refer to a strict practice of following precedent,
and that is the sense in which I use it here--to distinguish the doctrine of stare decisis
from the doctrine of precedent. I discuss this distinction m more detail in the text aCCOM-
panying infra notes 109-111.
11 Guioo CALABRESI, A CommoN LAw FOR Tin: AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982). Bla see
Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical finis -prudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 VALE L.J.
1651, 1652-53 (1994) (noting that historical jurisprudence "predominated ... in the
United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and has played an im-
portant role in the thinking of American judges and lawyers down to the present day ....
Indeed, it is the foundation of the English and American doctrines of precedent").
12 E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043, 1046-47 (1975).
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legal history. Anastasoff makes no greater claim than this bare mini-
mum and does not require the "strict" doctrine discussed by these his-
torians. Furthermore, one can cite earlier instances in which courts
strictly adhere to the binding force of a single decision than some his-
torians have previously recognized.
Thus, although I will have a few points to make about historical
methodology, this Article does not focus solely upon what the Framers
would have assumed about precedent. We cannot know precisely what
the Framers had in mind when they used the term 'judicial power."
But Anastasoff is at least convincing in its general point. History can be
used in other ways to support the result in Anastasoff, in addition to
ascribing an intent to the Framers. I suggest there is continuity over
time in this basic understanding of how courts will operate, despite
cyclical variations in the degree to which prior precedent is consid-
ered binding.
The second set of issues that I will address are those directed to-
ward the future effects or consequences of the holding in the case.
Thus far, the tendency has been to assume a stricter version of the
doctrine of precedent than A nastasoff claims. Assuming Judge Arnold
is correct in his interpretation of Article III, and thus assuming that a
theory of precedent is mandatory at some level, what are the possibili-
ties for departures from precedent? If there is an Article III restriction
on what courts must consider to be precedent, is there not also a cor-
responding Article III restriction on what courts can do to deviate
from precedent (by distinguishing cases, restating holdings, and so
forth) ?
As described in more detail below, my answer to this last question
is no. In Anastasoff, the court stressed that it was not "creating some
rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents."" The specific re-
sult of Anastasoff  s historical inquiry is less ambitious than many fear.
According to Anastasoff, courts are free to overrule or distinguish
precedent, but they are not ii -ee to ignore it entirely. Courts are not
strictly bound to follow prior precedent, but at a minimum they must
take note of the prior determination and explain any choice to decide
the matter differently. This view is consistent with how most legal
scholars have thought about precedent at most tittles. Indeed, it is a
fundamental assumption of common-law systems. This core idea of
precedent has survived two centuries of wildly changed perceptions of
the nature of the American common law. To understand judicial
13 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
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power as the Framers might have intended, it is appropriate to defer
to this consistent practice." This tradition tends to prove that Article
III constitutionalized this core idea of precedent, and it is nothing
more than this core idea that Anastasoff has affirmed.
I. THE COURT'S USE OF HISTORY IN ANASTASOFF
[lin the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent was well-
established in legal practice (despite the absence of a reporting system), re-
garded as an immemorial custom, and valued for its role in past strultles
for liberty.
—Anastasoff v. United States (2000) 15
Before proceeding further it is useful to provide a working
definition for what is often termed the "traditional" doctrines of
precedent, and then a brief summary of the Anastasoff decision itself.
As usually stated, the doctrine of precedent at its core is that the hold-
ing of a case • must he followed in similar cases, until overruled. 16
"Binding" precedent—from factually similar cases in the common law
setting and from prior interpretations of statutes in the area of legisla-
tion—must either be followed, distinguished, or overruled. Binding
precedent is a presumptive but not an absolute constraint on what
courts may do. When the source of law is the common law, as opposed
to interpretation of a statute or a constitution, it is often said that a
case is squarely on point only if the facts of the case are sufficiently
similar and the general principles ,necessary to the decision corre-
spond to the present case. If not, the prior case may be "distin-
guished," and there is then said to be no precedent to follow." This is
the "case system game" described by Karl Llewellyn, "the game of
matching cases." 18 Indeed, it is often said that the classification of a
14 In several contexts, the Supreme Court has indicated it is willing to defer to consis-
tent, historical practice in interpreting constitutional requirements without inquiring too
deeply into questions of original understanding. See generally, e.g., Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898,903 (8th Cir. 2000).
16 See GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 80.
17 See BERmAnt ET AL., supra note 9, at 367; Schauer, supra note 6, at 599-600.
18 KARL N. LLEWELIXN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 49 (1960). Or as noted by Pound: 'The
tables of cases distinguished and cases overruled tell a significant story." Roscoe Pound,
The Theory of Judicial Derision, 36 14Anv. L. REV. 940,943 (1923).
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legal system as common law, as opposed to civil law, is because it is
based upon a system of precedent.°
In Anastasaff, the Eighth Circuit faced precedent in which, except
for the fact that it was an unpublished decision, there was no question
of .distinguishing or the "game of case matching." Faye Anastasoff
sought relief in the district court from the refusal of the IRS to con-
sider her claim for a tax refund. The IRS received the claim one day
after the expiration of the statutory claim period, although Anastasoff
had mailed the refund before the close of the three-year period. The
IRS, and the federal district court, took the position that the statutory
scheme requires the date of receipt, and not the date of mailing, to
determine whether the claims period has expired. 2°
A prior, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, Christie v. United States, held squarely in favor of the
IRS's interpretation of the statute. 21
 Furthermore, it was the only deci-
sion within the Eighth Circuit ever to address the precise statutory
question raised by Faye Anastasoff. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit,
Ms. Anastasoff made no attempt to distinguish Ghristie. 22 Rather, she
contended that the court was not bound by Christie because it was an
unpublished decision and thus not precedent under the Eighth -Cir-
cuit rule that "unpublished opinions are not precedent ... . "23
19 See BERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 469. Berman states:
In "common law" countries judicial opinions are a primary source ()flaw and
prior judicial decisions are binding precedents in subsequent cases. In "civil
law" countries, on the other hand, the primary source of law is legislation and
courts are bound not by precedents btu by prmisions of comprehensive codes
of criminal law, civil law, and procedure „ , . In "common law" eon ntries the shirt-
ing point forjudicial reasoning is said to lie in past decisions.
Id. (emphasis provided).
20 Anastasoff, 223 F.3(1 at 899.
21 Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir.
Mar. '20,1992) (per curium) (unpublished). One irony in this debate is that opiatiOns des-
ignated "not for official publication" are widely available on the internet and through elec-
tronic databases such as Lexis and Wesdaw. Although not officially published in the federal
reporter systems, these opinions are clearly "published" in the sense that they are readily
available to die public.
22 Although Christie was designated not for publication, it was no mere one-line
affirmance. The opinion provided a sufficient recitation of the facts and die court's rea-
soning process that even Anastasofrs counsel cot 'ceded that Otrisiie was clearly on point.
23 The hill text of the rule is: "Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally
should not cite them, when relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judicat a, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any unpublished opinion."
8771 CIR. R. 28A (i) (emphasis provided).
88
	
Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 42:81
The outcome of the dispute in Anastasoff was easy for the panel.
Ms. Anastasoff lost the appeal because Christie previously decided the
same question against her, and that decision is controlling because a
panel cannot, on its own, overrule prior precedent. That must be
done, if at all, by the Eighth Circuit sitting en bane." Under Judge
Arnold's view, precedent is simply the record of how courts have de-
cided prior cases, whether or not those decisions are published in a
memorandum opinion. Whether fully explaining its reasoning, or
only tersely so in the context of a per curiam opinion designated as
not for publication, "[il 'therein in every judicial decision is a declara-
tion and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law .... This
declaration of law ... must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly
situated parties." 25 For the panel to ignore Christie simply because it
was unpublished would mean, potentially, that like cases are not
treated alike. Persons in similar circumstances may get different re-
sults with no explanation. As Judge Arnold put it, courts would essen-
tially be telling litigants: "We may have decided this question the op-
posite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today, and, what's
more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday."26 In other
words, there could be an intra-circuit split, but one of the decisions
would be "underground" law, the other, "legitimate" law.
The bulk of the opinion in Anastasoff is devoted to a theory for
the invalidity of the non-citation rule. According to the court, the
portion of the rule which specifies that unpublished opinions are not
precedent violates the Constitution because it purports to confer
21 This practice, that a precedent inay not be overruled. by a panel but only by the
whole court sitting en bane, is common but not uniform practice among the circuits. In
some circuits, the practice is specified by court rule. See, ex., FED. CIR. R. LOCAL. Rutx.
35(a) (2) ("Although only the court en bane may overrule a binding precedent, a party
may argite, in its brief and oral argument, to overrule a binding precedent without peti-
tioning fin . hearing en banc. The panel will decide whether to ask the regular active judges
to consider hearing the case en bane."); 6111 CIR R. 206(c) ("Reported panel opinions are
binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion
of a previous panel. Court en bane consideration is required to overrule a published opin-
ion of the court."). In the Eighth Circuit and others, the practice is not specified by court
rule but is a matter of convention, developed in prior case law. See Brown v. First Nat'l
Bank, 844 E2d 580, 582 (8111 On 1988) ("[Ohte panel of this Court is not at liberty to
overrule an opinion filed by another panel. Only the Court eu brae may take such a
step."). In the Seventh Circuit, although there is no formal requirement for precedent to
be overruled only by the court sitting en bas ic, a panel may not publish a decision that
overrules a prior precedent unless it is circulated to all active members of the court for the
opportunity to rehear en bane. 7111 CIR. R. 40(e).
25 A nagasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.900 (citations omitted).
26 Id. at 904.
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greater power on the federal courts than was contemplated by Article
111. 27 Specifically, the Court stated "The Framers of the Constitution
considered these principles [which form the doctrine of precedent]
to derive from the nature of judicial power, and intended that they
would .limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by Article III of
the Constitution."28 Anastasoff attributes to the Framers an ideal of the
constraints under which courts would operate.
In support of this proposition, the opinion provides an interest-
ing look.at
 the doctrine of precedent in English and colonial practice
immediately before the ratification of Article III. The basic argument
rests upon the proposition that the Framers accepted a particular un-
derstanding of judicial power—one that considered the doctrine of
precedent to be essential—when they constructed the judicial power
in Article III. The court's review of historical material was central to
its originalist interpretation: "The Framers accepted this understand-
ing of judicial power (Sometimes referred to as the declaratory theory
of adjudication) and the doctrine of precedent implicit in it." 29 That
is, the Framers intended to confer only this power on the federal judi-
ciary, a power that "the judge's duty to follow precedent derives from
the nature of the judicial power itself." 39 And though we might point
out that judges in the Founding period accepted a wider range of ac-
ceptable sources of law than would our own era, 31
 the evidence sug-
gests, as Judge Arnold noted, that "[tike Framers thought that, under
the Constitution, judicial decisions would become binding precedents
in subsequent cases."32 Thus, the source of the requirement that fed-
eral courts consider their prior decisions as precedent comes from
Article III, not frOm a general policy or tradition as usually poi.-
traye d.33
27 Anaslasoff relies upon Article III, Section 1, Clause 1: "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1, quoted
in Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900 n.3.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
29 Id. at 901-02.
38 Id, at 901.
31 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, 13011er:fly Effects: the Possibilities of Law Teaching in a Democ-
racy, 41 DUKE L.J. 741, 754 (1992) ("Official reporters of judicial decisions were in place hi
most. American jurisdictions in 1815, decades before such a function was known to Eng-
land, France or Germany."); Kempin, supra note 9, at 30 n.4.
32 AnaStaSOff, 223 F.3d at 902.
" Kempin, for example, defined the "modern" doctrine of stare decisis in the United
States as "a general policy of all colitis lo adhere to the ratio decidendi of prior cases de-
cided by the highest court in a given jurisdiction . As applied to the highest courts in
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I have referred to the court's underlying method as originalist,
meaning the method that uses history to interpret the Constitution in
order to gain some understanding of what the Framers' intended
when they chose the words that they did. Under this theory the Fram-
ers' intent is controlling. The text itself is. of binding authority. Judi-
cial power, however, is never defined in the Constitution. In cases of
unclear text, originalists consider the intentions of the drafters to be
binding, although such efforts often reveal the extreme difficulty in
practice of either ascertaining original intent or functioning without
an explicit statement of it. There are, of course, extreme forms of
originalism such as "strict textualism" and "strict intentionalism."34
Judge Arnold's opinion appears to follow—by necessity—what Paul
Brest has described as . "moderate originalism," because he is more
concerned with the adopters' general understanding than with their
specific intentions. 35
With an originalist approach, even assuming one has identified
the relevant categories. of persons whose thought processes are bind-
ing, all questions of specific intent are difficult, if not impossible, to
reconstruct later. Few will find this surprising given that originalist
conclusions claiming to find an intent or an understanding are inher-
ently precarious. Inquiries seeking original understandings necessarily
determine which of various competing groups hold the views that
matter. Originalists must follow some historical method to determine
what these relevant groups thought or believed, often when no direct
evidence on the specific point exists. 56
We cannot know much more about what the Framers thought
about precedent because no one at the Constitutional Convention, or
afterward in the ratification effort, seems to have said anything
specific about it. Perhaps some features of the judicial power—such as
that courts would generally rely upon precedent in deciding cases—
were so fundamental that the Framers' assumptions never became is-
sues of debate. In any event, iu Anastasoff the doctrine of precedent is
each jurisdiction, however, stare decisi.s is purely a matter of policy." Kenapin, supra note 9, at
28-29 (emphasis provided).
'4 See Pollyi Price, Term Limits on Original Intent? An Essay on Legal Debate and Historical
Understanding, 82 Va. L. REV. 493, 500 n.22 (1996).
	 •
35 Paul Brest has described "moderate originalism" as follows: The text of the Consti-
tution is authoritative, but many of its provisions are treated as inherently open-textured.
The original understanding is also important, but judges are more concerned with the
adopters' general purposes than with their intentions in a very precise sense." Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 REV. 204,204-05 (1980).
36 SeejACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS	 (1996); Price, supra note 34, at 496.
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an assumed feature of their belief system, based upon the prevalence
of the idea at the time. One wonders, for example, whether an open
and notorious refusal to take note of precedent would have been con-
sidered an impeachable offense, given that "the constitution, by a
positive injunction, prescribes the duty of the judiciary department
• „ [by] prescribing limits to its authority, which if violated would be
good cause of impeachment, and of removal from office." 37 No one
addressed that specific question either, so far as I can tell.
When one engages in an originalist inquiry, the use of history is
unavoidably selective: we select those parts that we believe aid us in
answering the question about the original meaning of the language
chosen for Article III. The historical evidence marshaled in Anastasoff
highlights the best of the secondary evidence of what the Framers and
ratifiers would have assumed. Although I do not restate that evidence
here, it included the struggle for independence of the courts and su-
premacy of the common law over rival systems. One could also note,
however, other evidence from the ratification debates that supports
Anastasoff s general point. Both Brutus and the Federal Farmer viewed
the tendency of common law courts to move toward "rigidity," pre-
sumably from their practice of following precedent. The Federal
Farmer warned that "the rigid systems of the law courts naturally be-
come more severe and arbitrary, if not carefully tempered and
guarded by the Constitution, and by laws, from time to time."" Simi-
larly, Brutus noted the tendency for principles that form court deci-
sions to "become fixed, by a course of decisions . . . ."30 Furthermore,
within fifteen years of ratification of the Constitution, William Cranch
wrote in the preface to his reports of Supreme Court decisions:
Whatever tends to render the laws certain, equally tends to
limit that discretion; and perhaps nothing conduces more to
that object than the publication of reports. Every case de-
cided is a check upon the judge. He can not decide a similar
case differently, without strong reasons, which, for his own
justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to
57 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
TO THE CONS'FITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATEs
AND OF THE COMMONWEAL ;I'll OF VIRGINIA 359 (1803).
58 FEDERAL. FARMER No. 15 (1788), goofed in 4	 B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER,
THE FOUNDERS ' CoNsTrTuTtoN, 233 (1987).
89 BRUTUS No. 12 (1788), quoted in KURLAND & LERNER, .supra note 38, al 23b.
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corruption are thus obstructed, and the sources of litigation
closed.40
On the other hand, skeptics of the determinacy of originalist in-
terpretations might point to contrary evidence on the issue of stare
decisis as a mandatory feature of the federal judiciary. One might
point out that the debates over Article III were not about how courts
would decide cases but were concerned with length and tenure of
office, manner of appointment, removability, jurisdiction, how many
courts and what kind, and other structural issues.41
 For these reasons,
one might argue, it is a stretch to add "respect for precedent" to the
mix of issues that judicial power was viewed by the Framers to be
about. Indeed, the term judicial power appears twice in Article III—
not just in Section 1,42
 cited by Anastasoff, but also in Section 2: "[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising un-
der this Constitution .. ."4' In this latter occurrence of judicial
power, it is quite clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention that judicial power was coilsidered-to be interchangeable
with the original phrasing of that clause: "The junsdiction of the Su-
preme Court shall extend . . "44
 The 'jurisdiction" language. domi-
nated what is now Article III, Section 2, throughout the constitutional
debate, and likely was changed to "judicial power" near the end of
debate merely as a matter of style. In terms of the final structural re-
sult, the judicial power in Section 1 vests, while the judicial power in
Section 2 extends. The court in Anastasoff chose Section 1 as the source
of the understanding that courts must accord at least some preceden-
tial value to their prior decisions. But it also could have cited Section
2, because judicial power in Section 2 of Article III seems to have a
similar meaning, although more closely tied to court structure rather
than function.
I have no illusions about determinacy in originalist interpreta-
tions of the Constitution. Yet one could judge favorably Anastasoffs
historical method by a preponderance of the evidence standard.
While I recognize there are points on which one might quibble with
the historical record presented in Anastasoff, there is ample evidence
'w 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) iii—iv (1804) (Preface by William Cranch).
41 See generally, e.g., TIIE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
42
 "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § I, cl. I.
13
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14 SeeKuRLIND & LERNER, SUPra note 38, at 225 (emphasis provided).
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to prove Judge Arnold's general point.45 It is reasonable to conclude
that informed thinkers in the Founding period expected a doctrine of
precedent to work at least some minimal degree of constraint on the
methods all courts would use to decide controversies.
I also propose, however, that one might support the constitu-
tional argument in other ways. There are also other methods of con-
stitutional interpretation, including versions of textualism and those
that focus upon structure and function of the Constitution as a whole.
There have been some suggestions that due process and equal protec-
tion may support the notion that courts must consider the preceden-
tial value of unpublished opinions, although no court as of yet has
agreed.46 In the next section, I survey several aspects of nineteenth-
century jurisprudence in order to propose that the understanding of
judicial power suggested in Anastasoff may be supported by other in-
terpretive methods as well.47 In particular, I argue that this core no-
tion of beginning with precedent has been consistently followed for
over two centuries, most importantly by the post-Founding genera-
tions. To be sure, the historical record reveals significant disagree-
ment at various points concerning the binding nature of precedent.
But prior to the appearance of the non-citation rules at issue in
Anastasoff, no one had suggested that courts should not at least begin
their reasoning process with prior decided cases. In section III, I use
these historical illustrations and arguments to suggest why we are only
now considering the extent to which Article III dictates to courts the
use of precedent as a starting point for decision.
. 15 For instance, the "authority" of prior cases as precedent could have a range of mean-
ings, any of which may be consistent with the historical evidence presented by the coml.
Precedent cm ild be used as a vide to decision, as illustralitig the nature of' the law on the
question involved, or even as mere evidence of a "tine" law without any independent bind-
ing authority. See Kempitt, supra note 9, al 30-31. 33.
46 See David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United Slates Courts of Appeals, 63
CORNELL L. km 128, 141-45 (1977) (describing cases).
47 I note, but do not consider in this article, the interesting parallels between the issues
in Anastasoff and the recent controversies over the practice of vacating opinions following
post-trial or post-appeal settlement. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Reuniting History: The Notwiety of
Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. Rev. 589
(1991); Judith Resnik, Mose Judgment? Vacatingludgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the
Role of Adjudication at the Close of the noentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1471, 1501-04
(1994); Daniel Purcell, Comment, The Public Right to Precedent: A Themy and Rejection of
Vacatur, 85 CAL. L. Rev. 867 (1997).
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II. POST-FOUNDING VIEWS: PRECEDENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Unless the rule of stare decisis is adhered to in the administration of jus-
tice under a government of laws, all property must be rendered insecure.
—Jones v. Anderson. (1808) 48
The following survey of three important aspects of nineteenth-
century jurisprudence shows continuity over time in the Framer's
core notion of precedent. I discuss, in turn, vested rights and protec-
tion of property, the codification debate, and the debate over general
federal common law. Each of these issues affected the development of
American law generally and the development of doctrines of prece-
dent specifically. I chose vested rights and protection of property be-
cause in the immediate post-Founding period we see courts articulat-
ing a rationale for adherence to precedent specifically linked to
protection of private property rights. I chose the codification debate
because, over a period of several decades, proposals for codification
forced debate about the nature of the common law, and implicitly, the
doctrine of precedent within it, while in the end the core notion of
precedent survives. I chose the third topic, the nineteenth-century
question of the existence of a general federal common law, because
the issue led to acceptance of the idea of separate common-law juris-
dictions within one nation—a blow to the theory of the common law
as one system of general principles existing apart from case law.
Taken together, these three discussions, I suggest, show that the
core idea of precedent that Anastasoff attributes to the Framers has
been fairly consistent over time, despite changed perceptions of the
nature of the American common law. These discussions also show that
when historians locate the beginnings of a strict, traditional doctrine
of precedent only in the nineteenth century, they are not disputing
what I term the core idea of precedent that Anastasoff claims. Indeed,
it is the effect of these historical episodes on the question of the bind-
ing nature of precedent, not precedent as a starting point, that has
caused historians to locate different dates for the beginning of the
"strict" notion of precedent.
A. Vested Rights and Protection of Property
By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of
precedent took on a particularly urgent role. Courts articulated a
48 4 Yeates 569, 575 (Pa. 1808).
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strict doctrine of precedent in order to stabilize property rights.
Judges frequently spoke of the necessity to follow precedent because
of settled expectations about property. 49
 One of the earliest state-
ments reflecting this view came from Pennsylvania. The 1808 case of
Jones v. Anderson, quoted at the outset of this section, specifically held
that without the rule of stare decisis all property is rendered inse-
cure.5°
Another early view was expressed in an 1823 decision from New
York. In Lion v. Burliss, Chief Judge Spencer wrote: "Stare decisis is a
maxim essential to the security of property; the decisions of courts of
law become a rule ... and where that rule has been sanctioned and
adopted in our courts, it ought to be adhered to, unless manifestly
wrong and unjust."51 This "maxim," from the New York decision an-
nouncing it, is frequently cited in other courts throughout the nine-
teenth century. 52
Protection of private property ranked high among the funda-
mental rights. In an argument before the United States Supreme
Court in 1849, counsel urged that the Court had only to "adhere to
the just rules already laid down, to practise [sic] the great maxim
which secures respect and renders certain the rights of property and
life, Stare decisis."53
 Among the recognized elements of a case de-
manding the support of the doctrine of precedent, said the Court, is
"especially, and above all, its constituting a rule of property or becom-
ing a muniment of title to it."54
49 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coxe, 4 Dail. 170, 192 (Pa. 1800) ("Stare decisis, is a
maxim to be lick! forever sacred, on questions of property."). The mend continues well
into later parts of the nineteenth century. See Leavenwortli Comity Cornet. v. Miller, 7 Kan.
479, 540 (1871) ("These decisions have been published by legal authority, and have he-
come rules of property, and precedents fin. future decisions.").
50 4 \Cates at 575.
m 20 johns. 483, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 18'23).
in See, e.g., Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 605 (1860) (quoting Lion, 20 Johns. at 487).
" Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 379 (1849). Typical also is the Alabama Su-
preme Court's exposition in flays v. Cockrell, 41 Ala. 75 (1867):
IT I his court has decided that the doctrine of meets rt, Biyan is a law of prop-
erty, and has twice distinctly announced that it would not override that case,
but suffer it to stand as an exposition of the law, according to which the peo-
ple might act, and shape their wansactions without Nprebension. Alen  must
be presumed to have acted in reference to it, and in reference to the assur-
ance of its stability; property has been received, and delivered, and trans-
ferred ... by many persons.
Id. at 90-91.
54 Smith, 48 U.S. at 379.
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Judicial rhetoric links the doctrine of precedent with protection
of settled property expectations throughout the nineteenth century. 55
Indeed, attorneys considered the doctrine of precedent to be a valu-
able tool for arguing cases. In an Alabama court, an attorney urged
that "[t] his decision has become a rule of property, and has been uni-
formly acted upon as such in this State for nearly thirty years. It is too
late to disturb it. The maxim, 'stare decisis,' must apply here or be re-
pea led. "56
The notion of a judiciary geared to protect economic interests is
generally consistent with the reigning paradigm of interpretation for
this period—a paradigm which emphasizes the role of economic
thought in shaping judicial decisions. 57 Another explanation for the
new emphasis on protection of property, apparent by the early dec-
ades of the nineteenth century, may be the larger context of the de-
velopment of constitutional theory in the post-Founding period. One
important strand of nineteenth-century American constitutionalism
was the doctrine of vested rights, rooted in a higher law tradition.
The case that best exemplifies the vested rights doctrine is Fletcher
v. Peck, probably best known as the case first used by the Supreme
Court to extol the sanctity of vested rights in property and thus to se-
cure broad meaning to the contract clause. 58 In Fletcher v. Peck, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the state of Georgia had infringed a valid con-
tract for property.59 For the first time, the Court expressly held state
legislation invalid because it conflicted with the federal Constitu-
tion. 60
 According to Chief Justice Marshall, a government must be-
55 See, e.g., Dubuque v. III. Cent. R.R., 39 Iowa 56, 82 (1874) ("Oscillating decisions of a
court of last resort tend to disturb the tenure of property and the rights of the people, and
weaken confidence in the courts."); State v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 48 Md. 49, 98 (1878)
("The ride 'stare decisis' is one of the most sacred in the law „ Authorities established are
so many laws, and receding from then, unsettles property, etc."); Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss.
246, 256 (1855) ("All questions having an important bearing upon titles to property, and
which have, as in this instance, been once carefully considered, and solemnly settled by
this court, ought not to be treated, as open for future investigation."); Den ex Dem. Mickle
v. Matlack, 17 N.J.L. 86, 101 (Ni. 1839) ("Siam decisis is the rule of law ... essential to the
repose of property.").
50
 Napier v. Jones, 47 Ala. 90, 90 (1872) (emphasis provided).
57 See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977). For a description of the reigning paradigm and its various proponents, see Al-
fred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment: The Moral Worlds and Modes of Reasoning of Antebellum
Jurists, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1164-66 (1999) (reviewing PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS
HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1997)).
58 10 U.S. (6 Grand') 87 (1810).
59 See id. at 139.
60 See id.
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have under the limitations of a private person.61 If a private person
had granted land, there is no remaining right to take it back once it
has "vested. "62 A government has no greater right. 63 As Chief Justice
Marshall wrote in Fletcher. "It may well be doubted whether the nature
Of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the
legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be
found, if the property of an individual fairly and honestly acquired,
may be seized without compensation. "64
The ascendancy of substantive protection for property is also evi-
dent in Gardner v. Village of Newburgh. 65
 Chancellor Kent considered
the prohibition of a government's taking private property without just
compensation to be "a great and sacred principle of private right,"
even though the New York state constitution lacked an express takings
provision.66
 This period is notable for judges' tendency to define
property expansively and to protect it against government intrusion
based upon natural-law-type arguments. 67 The Supreme Court even
suggested that there was a constitutional right to rely upon precedent
when private property is at issue. In Gelpcke v. City of Dtibuque, 68 the
Court in effect said that an unconstitutional taking of property oc-
curred when railroad bonds were issued in reliance on precedent and
a state court later. disavowed that precedent. 69
The severity of the Court's willingness to protect private property
from government takings in this period contributed to the greatest
crisis in the nineteenth century: The conflict over slavery. Emancipa-
tion, it was commonly believed, could not be legally accomplished
without government compensation to slave owners." The most ex-
treme example of the vested rights doctrine was the suggestion that
prohibiting slave owners from taking their slaves into United States
61 See id. at 137.
62 See id.
65 10 U.S. at 87.
a hi. at 135.
65 1 N.Y. Ch. Aim. 332 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
66 Id.
67 E.g.. Wynebanter v. People. 13 N.Y. 378 (N.Y. 1856).
G5 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
69 Id. at 202-07; see Michael C. Collins, Brfbre Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Devel-
opment of General Constitutional Law, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1263, 1269 (2000).
7° See Carrington, supra note 31, at 805. Congress provided for compensated emanci-
pation of slaves in the District of Columbia, 12 Stat. 376, 538 (1861), and section four of
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids compensation for slaves emancipated by the Thir-
teenth Atnetlihnent. Prior to emancipation, President Lincoln favored compensation for
slave owners. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 6, 74 (1988).
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territories violated their property rights. 71 It is no surprise, then, that
the doctrine of precedent is shaped to buttress the protection of pri-
vate property.
Thus, in at least one general area of law—property rights—courts
express an urgency for the doctrine of precedent. This is apparent in
the early decades of the nineteenth century. Numerous cases, state
and federa1, 72 emphasize the doctrine of precedent as essential to the
security of private property." We also know that the Framers worried
about property rights and how best to preserve them. The emphasis
and rationale for the doctrine of precedent is consistent with this
view.
It is true that the compulsion to follow precedent, by the early
nineteenth century at least, depended to some extent upon the sub-
ject matter involved. Courts noted with some frequency that, when
the rule of a prior case involved something other than property, they
were less constrained by the doctrine of precedent to follow 4. 74
Property reliance interests received significant judicial notice, but that
fact does not mean that courts were not concerned about precedent
in other contexts. These varying emphases fall within Lord
Mansfield's admonition, in 1762, that "the reason and spirit of cases
make law; not the letter of particular precedents." 75 Whatever the de-
gree of concern to follow precedent, one had to begin with it.
When the original understanding of intent of the Framers is not
clear from debates and contemporaneous writings, then the behavior
of the participants, after but sufficiently close in time, should also be
71
 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
72 There are more state cases on this issue than federal, no doubt because state courts
dealt with property issues far more frequently than did federal courts. For examples of
federal cases emphasizing the link between stare decisis and property rights, see Rundle v.
& Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. 80, 93 (1852) ("The principles asserted and established
by these cases, are, perhaps, somewhat peculiar, but, as they affect rights to real property in
time State of Pennsylvania, they must be treated as binding precedents in this court."), and
ll'rnuigu Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 496 (1847) (Woodburyd., dissenting) ("So far from
disturbing decisions and rules of property clearly settled, I ant for one strongly disposed to
uphold bent, stare decisis.").
73 See Smith, 48 U.S. at 379 (argument of counsel) ("they have only to adhere to the just
rules already laid down, to practice the great maxim which secures respect and renders
certain the rights of property and life, Stare decisis."); Coppinger v. Rice, 33 Cal. 408, 416
(Cal. 1867) (The rule has become a rule of property, and to disturb it would produce an
incalculable amount of mischief. If there was ever a case in which the doctrine of stare
decisis should apply, it should here he applied."); see also Taliafero v. Barnett, 1 S.W. 702
(Ark. 1886),
7 '1 See, e.g., Webb v. Lafayette County, 67 Mu. 353, 368 (1878).
75 Fishier v. Prince, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1762).
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considered persuasive. 76 The immediate post-Founding generation
behaved as though starting with precedent was a natural obligation of
courts. To the extent the post-Founding era had forgotten the Fram-
ers' intent, or that it was "lost from memory" as Grant Gilmore might
have said,77
 they behaved in a way consistent with Anastasoff s view of
judicial power in Article III.
B. The Codification. Debates
The codification movement, a feature of legal debate in the mid-
decades of the nineteenth century, was the first sustained, critical ex-
amination of the common law system in the United States. 78 It was
pervasive. As one scholar has noted recently, It] hroughout the nine-
teenth century Americans regularly debated whether to reduce the
common law to a written code." 79
 Proponents of codification had
Various aims: Moderates thought that the common law, or at least
some portions of it, might be restated and clarified through reducing
it to a code of general principles. 80 Radical codifiers, on the other
hand, advocated a replacement of many of the common law's provi-
sions with new provisions contained in a code, no doubt influenced by
the Benthamite utilitarian ideas propounded earlier. 81 At least some
proponents of codification explicitly wanted to adopt a civil law sys-
tem like that in Europe, and in particular something similar to the
Napoleonic Code.° It is probably true that the decades of the
codification movement are the closest the United States ever came to
adopting a legal system different from that of its mother country.°
70 See Price, supra note 34, at 496.
77 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 20-21 (1977).
78 I consider the "codification 1110VC111f111" 10 comprise the years between ]erenu Ben-
tham's offer to codify the common law in the United States, in 1811, a nd the end of the
nineteenth celittt•y. By the end of the nineteenth century reformists had largely ceased to
call for reducing the entire corpus of the common law to code form and focused instead
on discrete areas for legislation. See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the
Gammon-Law Wm1d, 25 YALE j. INT'L L. 435, 501-15 (2000). Charles Cook's discussion of
the American codification movement focuses on the years 1820-1850, See generally CHAR-
LES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MovEmENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL
REFORM (1981).
79
 Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CIII.-KENT L. REX. 355, 355
(1999).
89 Charles Cook has categorized the various goals of competing groups of law reform-
ers to include "moderate" and "radical" codifiers. See Coati, sopra note 78, at 80, 83.
81 Id. at 74. 86-87.
82 Id. at 74.
83 Several states, including California, Montana, and Georgia, as well as the Dakota
'Territory (present-day North and South Dakota), adopted legislation in thc mid-
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The Field Code of Civil Procedure, precursor to the modern Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is the one great success story of nineteenth-
century codification zea1.84
Despite the anti-English rhetoric in some circles during the early
years of the confederacy and the Republic, there was never any seri-
ous doubt that the states and the federal courts would receive the
common law of England, meaning its method more particularly than
its substantive rules. 85
 The method, of course, was that courts would
generate a body of law through case-by-case adjudication. The moder-
ate codifiers wished to preserve the basic common-law approach, but
they hoped to clarify it by codifying certain elements. Indeed, the lim-
ited success that the codification movement can claim in California,
whose private law is more codified than some nations, nonetheless is a
fundamental affirmation of common-law method. 86
 Similarly, in other
states which codified large portions of their common law, the method
that courts used to interpret these new codes did not change. 87 That
is, courts continued to view prior cases as the primary source of law in
traditional common-law subjects. The new codes were merely evi-
dence of what the common law was, but the courts themselves were
free to continue developing this body of law on a case-by-case basis."
It is probably true that the debates about codification—begin-
ning as -early as Benthani's criticisms that the doctrine of precedent
does not constrain judges and that no one can know in advance what
nineteenth century that codified large segments of the common law of those states. See
Morriss, supra note 79, at 362-68. •
84 See COOK, Su/la ante 78, at 2110. See generally Steven N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and
the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW 8: HisT. Rex. 311
(1988); Steven N. &thrill, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
85 See GILMORE, supra note 77, at 19-25.
66 About ten years after the codification was enacted, an influential law review article
argued that the Civil Code should not be the sole source of law, as it is in civil-law jurisdic-
tions such as Louisiana. See generally john Norton Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting
the Civil Code, 3 W. COAST REP. 585 (1884). The article argued that judges should instead
view the Civil Code, whenever possible, as merely a declaration of existing common-law
rules, and interpret it using common-law precedents and customs. See id. The California
courts expressly adopted this view in 1888, and in 1901, the CalifOrnia legislature
confirmed this view by statute. See id.; see also Lewis Grossman, Codification and the California
Men tality, 45 14AsTINGs LJ, 617,619-20 (1994).
87 See Stanford v. Smith, 159 S.E. 666,667 (Ca. 1931) (characterizing statutory tort law
provision as a "mere codification of common-law rules"); see raw jean Louis Bergel, Princi-
ple Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073,1076 (1988) (considering state
codifications to be "simple techniques of 'consolidation' or 'restraint").
66
 See GlutoRE, supra note 77, 25-27, 69-74; Weiss, supra note 78, at 514; Shael Her-
man, The Fate and Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 407,425 (1996).
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the law is—coincide with the transformation of the view that prior
cases are themselves sources of law, not merely evidence of the "true"
law. At the time of the Framers, prior cases, though considered
precedent, were authority because they were evidence of the "general
principles" of the common law. 89 The challenge of the codifiers
brought into debate the conservative response that judicial opinions,
case law, were themselves sources of law. A single decision was, in a
sense, a mini-statute because of stare decisis. Those who wished to
preserve the common-law system from a complete codification helped
solidify the theory of a case as a source of law, a step better than con-
sulting precedent merely because it is evidence (which may be wrong)
of the true law.
In Georgia, for example, a legislative act in 1858 prohibited the
overruling of any prior decision of the Georgia Supreme Court.°
Such decisions were to be considered the law of the state "where they
have not been changed by the legislative enactinent." 91 Three years
later, a revised statute permitted the overruling of prior decisions, but
only by "the full bench."92 Commenting upon the authority of prior
case law in 1866, the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
When a question has once been decided by this Court, we
desire it to be distinctly understood that such a decision is,
with us, authority. If counsel can furnish us a decision, of this
Court, in point, he need go no further in his investigations. It
is unnecessary to consume his own time and ours, in arguing
that such a decision is the law. With us such decision is conclu-
sive of what the law is, until changed by the law making
power.93
The statute prohibiting overruling prior cases, as well as the 1866 ad-
monition by the Georgia Supreme Court affirming its view of prece-
dent, are contemporaneous with the first successful codification of
common law in Georgia in 1860. 94
Thus, the codification debates resulted in an affirmation by all
but the most radical elements that the American legal system should
At least this is the argument of Kempin. See Ken yin, supra note 9, at 33.
" See Kempin, supra note 9, at 42. This legislation may have been an attempt to protect
the institution of slavery.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 43 11.46:
" Gray v. Gray, 34 Ga. 499,501 (18(36).
94 See Weiss, supra note 78, at 511-12.
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remain distinctively common law in its methodology. Legislatures con-
sidered and ultimately rejected the idea of replacing entirely the
common law's theory of case-by-case development of law and its doc-
trine of precedent with codes. The debates forced the conclusion of
the positivist view that prior cases were themselves sources of law.
They also focused the inherent tension of the common-law system:
The greatness of the common law was often said to be its ability to
adapt and change with changing conditions in society. On the other
hand, legal positivism brought increasing awareness of the notion that
judges make law rather than discover it. Supporters of codification
often argued that capturing the common law in code form would en-
able citizens to better know what the law is. Furthermore, in theory at
least, courts cannot overrule portions of the code with which it may
come to disagree.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the moderate codifiers, wary
of the commitment of the judiciary to stare decisis, hoped to commit
the Framers' vision of precedent to statutory form. While codification
in the nineteenth century never succeeded on the scale that its origi-
nal proponents hoped (though it did have some success, more par-
ticularly in the early decades of the twentieth century), their goal con-
tinued in other forms.95 Langclell's scientific approach to law, an
attempt to reduce cases to black-letter principles, was a late nine-
teenth-century precursor to the Restatements of Law. Both Langdell's
quest for scientific principles, and the Restatements, are essentially an
alternative method of codification—stating the law in a dear fashion
so that courts might more easily follow it and less easily strike off on a
different path.
Once again, although the participants in these codification de-
bates argued about stare decisis, 96 or the binding nature of prior
precedent, there was little quarrel with the basic proposition that, as a
matter of method, courts must approach their decisionmaking proc-
ess by at least consulting prior cases.
C. The General Federal Common Law
There are several ways in which our contemporary vision of the
common law and its method differs from the past. One of the most
9' See GILMORE, supra note 77, at 69-70.
"° Robert Cover, for example, identified "slavish adherence to precedent" as among
the elements of the existing judicial system attacked by codifiers. ROBERT COVER, JuwrtcE
AccusED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE jUnIcIAL PROCESS 141 (1975).
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interesting differences between the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries is the vision of common law rejected by Eric Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins"—the case that ended the Swift v. Tyson line of jurisprudence
recognizing a federal general common law." The specific holding of
Erie was that federal courts must apply the substantive common law of
the state in which they sit, in the absence of federal law to the con-
trary." For almost one hundred years, federal courts had claimed
authority to disregard state common-law decisions for areas of law
deemed to be governed by "general" law, a doctrine most closely asso-
ciated with Swift.
The debate about the common-law jurisdiction of the federal
courts was a long one. One aspect of the debate, however, received
early resolution. In 1812, within a generation of the Framers, the Su-
preme Court held that federal courts had no authority to create or
recognize common-law crimes.'" The reason had to do with the pecu-
liarities of the limited federal government in a federal system. Federal
courts lack power to find sources of law in a body of customary law
collected in prior court decisions, absent specific statutory authority
to do so. 101 It took state judges significantly longer to yield to legisla-
tures their power to define crimes. 102 The question returned in an-
other guise in the years leading up to Swift. In 1834, the Court stated
in the case of Wheaton v. Peters "It is clear, there can be no common
law of the United States."
For my purposes, the well-traveled area of Swift, Erie, and the con-
tinuing presence of pockets of federal common law are important,
not for the federalism issues that they raise,104 but for the particular
view of common law over which Swift held sway for portions of the
97 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
9'9 id, at 78, 79-80, overruling- Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pei.) 1 (1842).
99 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
'°° See generally United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)
(holding that common law federal crimes are beyond the scope of Article Ill jurisdiction).
Earlier, justice Chase rejected common-law criminal jurisdiction in a circuit case, writing:
t is attempted, however, to supply the silence of the Constitution and Statutes of the Un-
ion, by resorting to the Common law, for a definition and punishment of the offence
which has been .rumtnitted: Ilua. in my opinion, the. United States, as a Federal govern-
ment, have no common law." United Stales v. Worrell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (Chase, Circuit
justice 1798).
101 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 (1978).
1 °2 See HORWITZ, So/7M note 57, at 9-16.
103 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
104 See generally 'IONS' FRIWER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SW/PT & ERIE CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981).
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nineteenth century. As understood by Swift, the common law was a
body of general principles for a court to interpret. Swift represents the
idea of a "general" common law, a law that exists apart from individ-
ual, past decided cases, which may themselves be "wrong" interpreta-
tions of a customary law. Swift may have represented competing no-
tions of governing law, but it is consistent with the idea that precedent
remained important within each system.
In Swift, Justice Story e ► risioned a general commercial law—a
customary body of rules common to many jurisdictions. One scholar
has noted that "[alt the time Swift was decided, the states did not
clearly conceive of 'general commercial law' as state law."05 Indeed, in
the early part of the nineteenth century, both state and federal courts
decided cases under a general, unwritten system of common law,
guided by former decisions which did not themselves have force of
law. 106 Over time, and until the decision in Erie, federal courts claimed
more areas in which to apply this "general common law."
In the decades following Swift, however, more and more jurists
began to view the common law as a creation of sovereign .will.N7 It be-
came common-place to view the common law in a legal positivist
sense—it varied from state to state because the law consisted solely of
past court decisions, not some "true" or universal common law exist-
ing apart from what courts decide in individual cases. Unwritten law,
which the common law was widely said to be, had become "written"
law at least in the sense that jurists recognized that courts were, in ef-
fect, issuing individual pieces of legislation. Although piecemeal and
gap filling, not to mention wholly subservient to the legislature, courts
were recognized as making law, and as they did so within their respec-
tive sovereign spheres there were bound to be differences. .
The Swift phenomenon adds yet another complication to our at-
tempt to understand precisely what past generations meant when they
considered that courts would follow precedent. And in a sense, it is a
manifestation of the very contradictions addressed by the codifiers-
the larger quest to articulate predictability, simplicity, and transpar-
ency for the common law as a legal system. On the other hand, if one
views prior case law merely as "evidence" of what the common law is,
prior cases can be "wrong" more easily than if prior cases are viewed
05 Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1245, 1276 (1996) (emphasis supplied).
tho See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of theJudiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 LIARv. L. REV. 1513. 1517-18 (1984).
to? See id.
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in the strict positivist sense to be themselves sources of law.w 8 That is,
the justification for departing from prior precedent changes quite
dramatically depending upon one's view of the prior cases as them-
selves a source of law.
But it is precisely this feature of the debate—whether cases them-
selves are considered to be binding sources of law—that has caused
historians to select various historical dates for the beginning of the so-
called "traditional" doctrine of precedent. What the review of history
has shown is that today we tend to conflate the ideas of precedent and
stare decisis. The two are not entirely the saute, however. Stare decisis.
is commonly used to refer to a strict sense of the degree to which
courts are to be bound by prior precedent. Stare decisis, meaning a
strict adherence to the doctrine of precedent, is a feature of the legal
formalist period predominant in later parts of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 109 With the possible exception of this formalist period, in the
United States there has never been any clear point of agreement con-
cerning stare decisis.no Yet whatever view one takes about the desk-
ability of stare decisis, the core notion of precedent as a beginning
point has held true."' However courts viewed the common law—as
evidence of a "true" law or in a more positivist sense—no one sug-
gested that individual court decisions were not precedent, and no one
suggested that courts did not at least begin the decision process with a
consideration of what courts had done in the past.u 2
08 For example, the Blackstonian view was that precedent need not he followed
"where the lousier determination is most evidently contrary to reason For if it be
found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a
sentence was bad law, but that it was not law." 1 WILLLANI BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-
70.
log See GILMORE, .slipra note 77, at 62-63; we also MIL. HUXBURY, PArrraNs of AmERI-
CANJURISPRUDENCE 141 (1997).
u° Harold Berman, for example, has said: "Not only is stare decisis not absolute but it
also has no clear meaning .... (T]lie ratio decidendi of a case is never certain." Berman
El' AL, Supra note 9, at 484.
111 1n a recent study, two authors conclude that even tinder a "liberal" version of stare
decisis, United States Supreme Court Justices "have a pima facie duty to conform to the
Court, but that obligation can he overridden if they offer a cogent reason for so doing."
SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATIoN Or PRECEDENT ON
THE SUPREME COURT 1946-1992, at 1 (1995).
" 2 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). Although these cases are reported
early in the twentieth century, and so do not precisely fit my general discussion of the late
nineteenth century, they are good examples of a consistent "method" for the conninot law
despite differing understandings reflected in the two cases about substantive result from
following precedent. Boils opinions go to great lengths to show continuity of the present
case with past cases—they simply disagree about the results of the inquiry into precedent.
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At no point during this debate over whether cases are a binding
source of law was there a widespread attempt to justify precedent as
carrying on the traditions of the Framers. It never would have oc-
curred to the next generations to ask this question because the basic
methods of the common-law system were never challenged. They
probably either assumed that they were carrying on the traditions, or
were simply not interested in the issue. The point is, these jurists be-
haved exactly as if Anastasoffs understanding of judicial power was
their own. There were no rules or practices by which courts would
have designated any of their prior decisions not to be worthy of con-
sideration, at least as a starting point, for future cases.
The preceding survey suggests that, at least in these snapshots of
the nineteenth century, the doctrine of precedent served various
needs and functions since the Founding period. Thus, it is of little
concern to me that the nineteenth century is sometimes character-
ized as one of loose adherence to precedent. 113 Even if this characteri-
zation is generally true (and I suggest the property cases, at least, cast
doubt on this assertion), this fact does not undermine Judge Arnold's
characterization of the importance of precedent around the time of
the ratification of Article III.
While it is not necessary to rely solely upon an originalist argu-
ment to reach the same result, I do not suggest that originalism was
the wrong approach in Anastasoff. It is, however, instructive to con-
sider alternative methodologies. These methodologies could also be
used to argue that judicial power in Article III assumes a bare mini-
mum of consideration of prior precedent. The behavior of the post-
Founding generations is consistent with this view of judicial power,
and this fact should be persuasive because it reflects the participants'
understanding of what judicial power required.
Furthermore, beyond the post-Founding generations, at no point
in American legal history has this core idea been seriously questioned.
Federal courts, and all state courts (with the possible exception of
Louisiana), have never viewed themselves to have the power to
change the fundamental nature of the American legal system. Prior to
the advent of the non-citation rules for Unpublished opinions, no
court has ever claimed that it could disregard entirely a prior judicial
decision in a similar case. The core idea of common-law court systems
is that what courts have .clone in the past, to some extent and to some
X19
	 CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 4; GILMORE., supra note 77, at 19-25; Wise, supra
note 12, at 1045-47.
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degree, must at least be considered when a similar case comes
along."4
III. PRECEDENT AND JUDICIAL POWER TODAY: WHY HAVE WE NOT
THOUGHT OF THIS BEFORE?
There is now wide agreement that a judge can and should participate crea-
tively in the development of the common law.
--Justice Roger Trayttor115
Anastasoff characterizes how the average jurist understood the
doctrine of precedent in the late eighteenth century. We seem to un-
derstand it differently today, if the prevalence of court rules concern-
ing the precedential value of unpublished opinions is any indication.
Most of the rules have come into being in the last several decades" 6 in
response to dramatically rising caseloads. 117
 Many of these rules spec-
ify that unpublished opinions are not precedent. 118 In the federal
courts, nearly eighty percent of all appellate decisions in 1999 were
designated not for publication." 9 In some state courts, well over half
of the court's decisions fall into this category. 120
The review of history in the preceding section and in what fol-
lows supports two propositions. First, the new non-citation rules that
consider sonic judicial decisions not to be precedent are an aberra-
111 See BERMAN ET Al..,	 note 9, at 469.
115 Roger Traynor, Comment on Paper Delivered by Charles D. Melte', in LEGAL. INSTITU-
TIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 52 (1959).
116 Most of these rules date back no earlier than the mid-1960s. "In 1964, the Judicial
Conference of the United States suggested that federal courts limit their number of pub-
lished opinions to increase efficiency." Jenny Mockenhaupt, Assessing the Nonpublication
Practice of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 19 Wm. MircitEl.t. L. REV. 787, 789 (1993). See also
the 1973 report of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Standards for Publication of
Judicial Opinions, which became the model for the majority of federal and state appellate
cowls. Ativisottv CouNcu. ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUDEICATION OF JUDI-
CIAL OPINIONS 18-20 (1973) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT];
supra, at. 79(1-91 (considering the report to be the "seminal document in the movement
toward an official policy of limiting- publication").
117 For a recitation of recent statistics on the volume of appeals in federal courts, see
Richard S. Arnold, Essay, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. Sc PROCESS 219,
221-22 (1999), which finds the increased volume a "serious prohlem."
IS See, e.g., FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) ("An opinion or order which is designated as not to he
cited as precedent is one unanimously determined by the panel issuing it as not adding
sign ifiCant ly to the body of law. Any opinion or order so designated must not he employed
or cited as precedent."); 5 .111 CIR. R. 47.5.4 ("Unpublished opinions issued on or after
January 1, 1996, are not precedent.").
119 See. fudirial Business, supra note 2, at 49.
120 See, e.g., Mocken hatipt„sttpra note 116, at 788.
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Lion in our historical practice. Second, jurists have always understood
the doctrine of precedent to require at least some initial reference to
a prior-decided, similar case, but the American doctrine has always
been flexible. Moreover, the binding force of precedent—at its ex-
treme, the doctrine of stare decisis—has never meant precisely the
same thing in any given era. Regardless, jurists have continued to fol-
low what I refer to as the core doctrine of precedent. What a court has
done before has always been considered at least relevant. Anastasoff
does not require that courts subscribe to any one particular theory of
the binding nature of precedent.
Anastasoff also stresses that it is not attacking the practice of with-
holding some opinions from official publication."' These rules came
into being with several purposes, many of which are legitimate con-
cerns quite apart from the question whether unpublished opinions
hold precedential value. 122 But courts may not ignore the fact that a
case was decided a particular way in the past. We now must consider
the argument that, at least for the federal courts, the rules are beyond
the courts' judicial power to the extent they deny the precedential
value of prior decisions. Somewhere. between the Founding and the
cavalier attitude toward the doctrine of precedent exemplified by
non-citation rules, we seem to have lost our way.
• We are tempted to lay the blame for the disjuncture between the
Framers' supposed beliefs about precedent and our own squarely at
the feet of the Legal Realists. Karl Llewellyn understood the dynamic
nature of precedent, 123
 and other realists viewed precedent to be
121
 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Such decisions may
be eminently practical and defensible, but in our view they have nothing to do with the
authoritative effect of any court decision.").
122 See Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., Essay, The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do
1he Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justifil the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L.
REV. 235. 241-43 (1998). The 1973 Report of the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice
recommended that appellate courts reduce the number of published opinions out of con-
cern for rising caseloads. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 116, at 19. "A variety of
criteria for choosing which cases are worthy of publication have been established by vari-
ous bodies in au attempt to define those that are 'important' enough to publish." Carpen-
ter, supra, at 241-42.
123
 For example, Llewellyn wrote that the doctrine of precedent is "Janus-faced." In
other words, "it is nut one doctrine, nor one line of doctrine, but two, and two which, ap-
plied at the same time to the same precedent, are contradictory of each other." See
LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 68. Llewellyn also wrote that "the available leeway in inter-
pretation of precedent is ... nothing less than huge." Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realison—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HAM*. L. REV. 1222, 1253 (1931).
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infinitely malleable and denied that law could be derived from it. 124
Because "we are all legal realists now,"125 we, too, tend to be skeptical
about the constraining force of precedent. 126
 Clever lawyers, we know,
can always distinguish cases or otherwise convince a court that the
principle derived from a prior case was not necessary to its decision.
Although Legal Realism may be the most recent influence on our
thinking about precedent, many of these issues had been raised be-
fore by Jeremy Benthatn 127 and others. As I have noted, there were
earlier points at which jurists and lawyers began to think differently
about the nature and methods of the common-law system. These epi-
sodes occurred significantly closer in time to that of the Founders and
perhaps cast some light on the views of that earlier generation.
The point I wish to make here is that Anastasoff, and its claim
about the requirements of judicial power, is not about the binding
nature of precedent. Instead, judicial power means merely that there
is a bare minimum—a core idea of precedent. Courts in common-law
systems traditionally have understood their decisionmaking process to
embody this core idea. The decisionmaking process at least begins
from prior precedent, whether the court then considers itself "bound"
by precedent, able to "overrule" precedent, or whether the court
chooses one of Karl Llewellyn's sixty-four possible treatments of
precede' t. 128
The second line of attack on Anastasoff s interpretation of Article
III, I suggest, will be directed at the future consequences if other
courts follow the lead of Anastasoff. One such criticism is likely to be
that it is impossible to define any doctrine of precedent inherent in
the judicial power of Article III, because to do so must mean that
courts are now constitutionally required to follow prior cases. And if
this is the significance of Anashisoff, have we not long ago discarded
the idea that precedent is ever binding on a court if the court wants to
141 See generally,	 jEuomE FRANK, LAW AND TIIE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM, L. REV. 809 (1935).
125 See Joseph William Singer, Ltgal Realism Now 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (re-
viewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (198(1)).
126 To cite a contemporary view of precedent, Richard Posner has written that prece-
dents are not 'the law' itself'," 1)111 merely "essential inputs into the predictive process."
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 227 (1990). It is not precedent
that "controls" so much as how one "chooses to read the precedent." Id. al 95. "(Title key
to the decision is precisely that choice, a choice not dictated by precedent—a choke as to
what the precedent shall be." /d.
127 Sre JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 19-20 (pl. Burns &
Hart e(Is., 1988).
128 KARL LLEAVELLYN, THE COMMON LA55' TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 75-92 (1960).
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decide a case in a particular way? In other words, we might ask what is
the fuss about whether these cases are to be considered precedent, if
binding decisions are not really binding—if courts can distinguish
between "narrow" holdings,129 "central" holdings,'" "essential" hold-
ings, 131
 not to mention cases that are "not controlling in the strictest
sense"?"2
 Some academics have long suggested the principle of stare
decisis is ignored or at least in serious decline." 3 Others argue that
the doctrine of precedent is, in fact, the "workhorse" of the system for
the majority of "unexceptionable" cases. 1M If anything, in the age of
statutes it has become easier for courts to adhere to precedent. When
interpreting statutes, courts rarely must reason by analogy in light of
prior cases and their principles. In Anastasoff, for example, there was
no possibility to distinguish Cluistie. A panel of the Eighth Circuit had
previously interpreted the statutory scheme to require a "receipt" rule
rather than the "mailbox" rule, and subsequent panels must follow
that interpretation until overruled by the court sitting en banc. 135
Another variation of the future consequences criticism of Anasta-
soff will be that these rules are necessary for the court to manage its
workload. Some have suggested that the work of courts will grind to a
halt if the nearly eighty percent of unpublished decisions now ren-
dered by courts must be considered more carefully." 6 Other solutions
to the workload problem (appointment of more judges, or a certio-
rari-type jurisdiction) are not within the courts' control.
129 See, e.g, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (referring to "emphatically narrow
Rolling" in prior case).
130 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to Roe v. (l'ade's "central holding"); Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326,
2342 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is not a matter of language; it is a matter of hold-
ings. The proposition that failure to comply with Miranda's rules does not establish a con-
stitutional violation was central to the holdings of Tricker; Hass, Quarles, and ELstad.").
131 See, eg, Apprendi v. New jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (2000) (referring to prior
case, "the court concluded that those doubts were not essential to our holding").
132 See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 519 (1995) ("That case is not con-
trolling in the strictest sense.").
133 See generally Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467 (1980).
134
 See Powell, supra note 6, at 14, 16.
135 The IRS subsequently abandoned its previous position based on Christie, announc-
ing acquiescence in the "mailbox" rule. On December 18, 2000, the Eighth Circuit vacated
the panel opinion in Anastasoff as moot, on the ground that the IRS had paid the tax-
payer's claim. Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917EM, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33247, at
*2 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (en bane).
156 Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reportedly criticized the
ruling on this ground. "It is a fallacy to think having more out there is better. More gar-
bage is not better „ . ." Quoted in Glaberson, supra note 7, at 4-4.
December 20001
	
Precedent a PI( (Judicial Power	 111
I suggest all of these prospective dire consequences of Anastasoff
are a misreading of Judge Arnold's opinion, which holds that courts
must seriously consider .how they have decided a like controversy in
the past before rendering a new decision in a similar case. Courts are
not free to determine that some of their judicial decisions are not
precedent. To the extent the result is that courts must now take more
time with the kinds of cases previously designated not for publication,
the remedy must be legislative, not judicial.'" It is certainly a serious
problem courts face. But other values 'outweigh the need for courts to
adopt the cavalier approach to decisionmaking reflected in the non-
citation rules. These include the value of transparency in judicial deci-
sionmaking, avoidance of an "underground" body of law that suggests
some litigants get lesser justice than others, and the effort, at least, to
decide like cases alike. In fact, the only way a court can know that it is
treating Like cases alike is through the discipline of a doctrine of
precedent.
One justification for non-publication rules has been as a matter
of convenience for courts. Many cases are routine, so the argument
goes, and thus lengthy, reasoned opinions are unnecessary to dis-
pense justice. These cases do not alter precedent—they merely affirm
it. If this is universally true, then Anastasoff will have no effect on the
continuation of this practice. Nothing in Anastasoff s reading of Arti-
cle III prevents courts from designating cases not for publication and
deciding them in a short, per curiam fashion. What they may not do,
however, is pretend that those cases never happened.
But the situation in Anastasoff itself belies the argument that all of
these unpublished decisions are, in fact, unimportant from the per-
spective of determining what is the court's precedent on a prior topic.
1 " judge Arnold noted:
It is often said among judges Mat the volume of appeals is so Itigh (hat it is
simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential value to every decision. We do not
Itave time to do a decent enough job, the argument runs, when put in plaht
language, to justify treating every opinion as a precedent. If this is true, the
judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the remedy is not to create an
underground body of law good for one place and time only. The remedy, in-
stead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or. if that is not
practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competently!) with each
case. If ibis means that backlogs will grow, the price must still be paid. At bot-
tom, rules like our Rule 28A(i) assert that courts have the Ibllowing power: to
choose for themselves, from among all the cases they decide, those that they
will follow in the future, and those that they need not.
Anastasoff, 225 F.3d at 904.
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The issue would never have arisen in Anastasoff if Christie fit this de-
scription of a per curiam opinion merely affirming, in summary form,
a long line of already established precedent. Christie was the only
Eighth Circuit decision to interpret this particular statutory problem,
and thus arguably it should never have been designated not for publi-
cation. At least one other circuit, in fact, has disagreed with Christie's
interpretation."8 To reverse Christie would require a majority vote of
the en banc court. If Faye Anastasoffs position were followed, the
panel could hold the direct opposite of Christie and have no obliga-
tion to justify the difference. The ability to cite unpublished opinions
may be the only way to uncover conflicts in the circuit. 139
Anastasoff itself thus provides compelling evidence that we have
little assurance that unpublished opinions do not create the dangers
we fear: That courts will interpret statutes, for example, one way one
day and a different way the next, with no accountability. Worse, per-
haps, is the fact that we can have no assurance that the Christies and
the Anastasoffs of the world are treated to the same set of laws. If they
are not, why not simply have a lottery system to determine the out-
comes of these disputes?
Another justification for barring citation to unpublished deci-
sions has been accessibility. Opinions not designated for official pub-
lication were, at one time, available only from the clerk's office. A liti-
gant with easy, and nearly exclusive, access to unpublished opinions
was thought to have an unfair advantage. Now, however, the opposite
is true: The so-called "unpublished" opinions are widely available on
electronic databases, including the internet.H° Therefore, this "unfair
advantage" justification for declaring that unpublished opinions have
ino precedential value has dropped out.
I want to propose one further, related question: Assuming we
agree that an appropriate interpretation of judicial power in Article
III includes some respect for precedent, how is it that we are only now
constitutionalizing this link? Although courts have considered the
term "judicial power" in Article III to impose constraints in other ar-
118 See Weisbart v. United States, 222 F.3c1 93 (2d Cir. 2000). The court's opinion in
Anastasoff stated: "We express no view on whether we would follow Weisbart if it were not
for the conclusive effect of Christie." Anasiosoff. 223 F.3d at 905 n.15.
139 Professcir Arthur Hellman has even suggested that "laJllowing lawyers to cite un-
published opinions is the best way of policing the courts' use of the practice." Quoted in
France, Unpublished Opinions, supra note 7, at 2229.
10 See Arnold, supra note 117, at 220.
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eas, 141 no one has suggested before that the notion of judicial power
includes an obligation to respect precedent, however undefined this
obligation may yet be. It is thus a new theory of the meaning of judi-
cial power. Assuming this is a plausible construction, why, then, has it
taken two centuries for the doctrine of precedent to be linked to judi-
cial power in Article III? If the original understanding of judicial
power ascribed to the Framers in A nastasoff is correct, why do so many
find this notion surprising today? In short, how did we come to forget
what was seemingly so clear to the Framers?
To think about these questions, I have suggested that it is helpful
to consider the post-Founding role of precedent in American legal
thought. From that consideration, straightforward reasons emerge for
this seemingly late realization about precedent's central position in
judicial power. It would never have occurred to a jurist of a prior gen-
eration to ask whether the basic operation of judicial power included
a requirement that it begin its consideration of a current case with a
view of what it decided in a past similar case. The reason is that courts
have never before considered that any of their prior decisions could
be irrelevant to future cases. The spate of court rules declaring non-
published opinions not to be precedent are a radical departure from
any court practice of the past. This is true even in periods in which
courts have not felt themselves strictly bound by past precedent.
If it is apparent that the doctrine of precedent has been cyclical
in the degree to which it might be considered "foundational," it is also
apparent that views of what I call the "departure" power—that is, the
circumstances under which courts may refuse to follow precedent—
have changed in response to various perceived needs. ht other words,
the circumstances under which courts have believed it to be appropri-
ate to overturn prior case law have also changed Over the course of
time. Often this cyclical approach is associated with predominance of
one or the other of the competing views about the nature of the
common law: Is it merely a collection of precedents or a method of
analysis?
Ill For example, judicial power animates the restrictions upon courts from entertain-
ing "polilicai questions" and otherwise exercising legislative p(Aver. See generally 'TRIBE,
SHP/ note 101, at 71. Marbary n Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803), may be
hest viewed as an interpretation of judicial power in its claim for the power of judicial re-
view. Although along with the various abstention doctrines, Ilse source of constitutional
authority or restraint may come from the structure and function of the Constitution as a
whole rather than a specific. textual intent in the phrase 'judicial power."
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Justice Traynor, in the quotation set out at the beginning of this
section, expresses a view consistent with the claim that courts in the
United States are not now particularly disposed to follow a strict doc-
trine of precedent. On the other hand, Traynor also wrote that in
contrast to the legislative process, "a judge invariably takes precedent
as his starting-point; [s] tare decisis signifies the basic characteristic
of the judicial process that differentiates it from the legislative proc-
ess." 42
 A few decades earlier, Benjamin Cardozo stated "that the rule
of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned,
ought to be in some degree relaxed." 143
 Judge Arnold in Anastasoff
wrote that he was not advocating "some rigid doctrine of eternal ad-
herence to precedents."144
 The model for such a rigid doctrine might
be the British House of Lords, which before 1966 took the position
that in its judicial capacity it could not overrule prior precedents.' 45
The rigid model that the English system became has been rare, if
non-existent, in court practices in the United States. Instead, in some
periods courts have celebrated the adaptability of the American
common law. There are many theories about how and why common
law in the United States has changed. Judge Richard Posner is a pro-
ponent of an "efficiency" thesis, positing that the common law tends
to "evolve" in ways that favor the economically efficient outcome,
whether or not consciously intended by judges. 146
 Justice Holmes was
also interested in the process of change and how principles of the an-
cient common law evolved into modern law. 147 Holmes reminds us
that precedent is not rigidly binding on future courts and for many
"2 RogerJ. Traynor, The 11'0-Tempered Judicial Decision, 21 ARK. L. REV. 287, 290 (1967).
145
 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921).
141 A nastasoff, 223 F.3(1 at 904.
145 See GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 123.
146 See generally Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory
of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Ap-
proach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REv. 757.(1975).
"7 See Richard A. Posner„avigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86 VA.
L. REV. 535, 542-43 (2000). Holmes wrote:
Mlle process which 1 have described has involved the attempt to follow
precedents, as well as to give a good reason for them. When we find that in
large and important branches of the law the various grounds of policy on
which the various rules have been justified are later inventions to account for
what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we have a right to recon-
sider the popular reasons, and, taking a broader view of the field, to decide
anew whether those reasons are satisfactory.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. Univ. Press
1963) (1881).
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reasons should not be. Our comfort level with that idea depends very
much on our conception of what policies are appropriate for judges
to pursue,
For several reasons, however, I suggest that even this lax regard
for precedent is nonetheless consistent with judge Arnold's view of
judicial power in Article III. In each of the historical discussions in the
prior section, the constraining features of precedent underwent some
change. The result is that we should not expect any consistency over
time in the doctrine of precedent as understood by the Framers, but
only in the core notion that a court must at least consider how it has
addressed a similar problem in the past.
Returning to the questions posed at the outset: If Article III re-
stricts the extent to which judges can disregard precedent, then must
it also have a compulsory side and not merely a negative one? If we
say that Article III requires courts to consider as precedent unpub-
lished opinions—that is, they may not declare any of their prior deci-
sions not to be precedent—then does Article III also define the extent
to which courts are required to follow precedent? That is, must we
have a uniform, normative vision of the circumstances in which a
court may depart from precedent?
To some extent the court in Anastasoff avoided the issue because
it could not overturn the prior precedent at issue in that case. As
Judge Arnold noted, a three-judge panel of the court could not over-
. turn prior precedent—that is an option only available to the court
sitting en bane. Thus the panel is bound by the unpublished decision
that its own rule would classify as not precedent. Nonetheless, Anasta-
soff cautions that it is not "creating some rigid doctrine of eternal ad-
herence to precedents."148 Sometimes, said the court, cases should be
overruled: "If the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if other
exigent circumstances justify it, precedents can he changed." 49 When
a court determines that a precedent should be changed, however,
there is a "burden of justification" in which the reasons for rejecting it
"should be made convincingly clear." 15° There is little guidance, then,
from Anastasoff about how rigid the constitutional doctrine of prece-
dent may be. For instance, is it beyond the scope of judicial power to
overturn a prior line of cases without fulfilling this "burden of
justification"?
He Anastasoff; 223 F.3(1 al 904.
I" Id. at 904.4)5.
I" Id. at 905.
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One way to consider this question might be to attempt to recon-
cile the various rationales articulated by courts for overturning prece-
dent. The most wide-ranging recent summary is provided by the plu-
rality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey. 151 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Sauter stated that "Nile
obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary
necessity marks its outer limit .... Indeed, the very concept of the
rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensa-
ble."152 The doctrine of precedent, the joint opinion suggested, is
animated by "principles of institutional integrity." 53
On the other hand, "the rule of stare decisis is not an inexorable
com ►and." 54 Casey suggested a balancing test to determine the ap-
propriateness of overruling prior case law:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment
is customarily informed by a series of prudential and prag-
matic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of
law.... Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has
proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workabil-
ity; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of over-
ruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doc-
trine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen
so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justifiCation. 155
Casey suggests that these circumstances under which a court may
overrule prior case law would apply whether the issue to be decided is
one of common law, statutory interpretation, or constitutional adjudi-
cation, although the Supreme Court has suggested in the past that
precedent carries less weight in constitutional adjudication than in
151 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
152 Id. at 854.
155 Id.
151 Id. (internal quotations °united).
155 Id, (internal citations omitted).
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statutory interpretation. 156
 Ironically, stare decisis carries even less
weight when the issue involves a mere "procedural rule." 157
 The tradi-
tional view, expressed in both Anastasoff and Casey, is that the decision
to overrule is a matter of propriety for a court—what it should not do
absent compelling circumstances, Thus, "a decision to overrule
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a
prior case was wrongly decided." 158
Presumably the factors summarized by the joint opinion in Casey
will provide the other part of the equation, that is, when a court may
decline to follow precedent that it has found to be relevant. In other
words, the decision to depart from precedent will remain a prudential
one, not one of constitutional proportion. We should not be sur-
prised, however, if jurists disagree with the joint opinion's view of the
binding nature of precedent. Moreover, even if the Supreme Court
were to announce that no precedent is ever purely binding even in
cases of statutory construction, Judge Arnold's point in Anastasoff re-
mains sound. At a minimum, the doctrine of precedent requires that
courts consider prior decisions, but it does not require that they fol-
low them,
Judge Arnold does not suggest that we are equally bound by what
the Framers' may have thought about this "departure power." He does
not attempt to demonstrate that courts are today bound to follow their
prior precedent to the same extent that the Framers, or anyone else,
would have thought appropriate. The constitutional violation is not
that courts do not follow the precedent set in their unpublished deci-
sions. A court does not have to follow its prior precedent. Rather, the
constitutional violation is when a court asserts that its decisions are
not precedent and cannot be cited at all. It is a distinction with a dif-
ference. 159 According to Anastasoff, courts are free to overrule prece-
dent, but they are not free to ignore it. The Framers no doubt at least
understood the common law's ability to grow. Common law that fails
to adapt to changing social conditions is quickly replaced by statute.
The common law is forever weighing the old tensions seen here, be-
tween stability and change, growth and stagnation. To the extent this
156 See James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Deei-
sis„ The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 346 (1986).
1 • 7 See United States v. Gandhi, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995).
1" Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
ins See Arnokl, supra note 117, at 226 (suggesting that failing to follow precedent is
equivalent to "legislative power, which can be exercised whenever ilre legislator thinks best.
and without regard to prior decision.").
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reality was unclear at the period of the Founding, I argue it was made
clear in the course of events of the nineteenth century.
CONCLUSION: THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Our expectations of judicial power do not vary greatly from those
of any prior period. We expect courts to treat everyone alike, and we
expect them generally to keep the law stable, Neither of these expec-
tations can be accomplished if courts create large bodies of law which
they explicitly disavow. We expect courts to have some beginning
working point to ensure some stability and some relative equality of
treatment of persons, That beginning point, at least in our common-
law legal system, is precedent—the record of how courts have decided
issues submitted for adjudication. Courts look first to how they have
decided cases in the past, not only because it saves time in the judicial
reasoning process when a similar question arises again, but also to en-
sure that litigants close in time receive roughly the same interpreta-
tion of the law. 16° Plaintiff Anastasoff should be treated like plaintiff
Christie. If not, the court must at least provide a good reason. Judge
Arnold's point is nothing more than this: Non-citation rules that
permit judges to decide cases one way one year, and another the next,
without explaining the difference, have no part in a system that claims
to operate within these basic, historical notions of judicial power.
Even Justice Holmes, who was generally revolted at the notion that a
court must follow precedent simply because a court had decided a
question before, 161 would have been revolted at the opposite notion—
that a court need not even consider what it decided in a prior similar
case.
The question at one level is whether one must rely on an origi-
nalist interpretation alone to reach this understanding of judicial
power in Article III. I have argued that other interpretive methods
support this result as well. In one sense, Anastasoff is akin to Marbuiy u
Madison in its assumptions about the nature of the American judici-
160 Treating like cases alike is a traditional justification for the doctrine of precedent.
See BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 111, at 4-5. Justice Douglas remarked that "there will be
110 equal justice tinder law if a negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the
afternoon." William 0. Douglas, Stare Dais's, 49 CoLum. L. REA% 735, 736 (1949).
161 "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that ... it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAM'. L.
REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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ary.162 Marbury was the vehicle used by Chief Justice Marshall to estab-
lish the power of judicial review—a power not clearly defined in the
United States Constitution but arguably assumed there. Marburg
affirmed the power of judicial review without any express provision of
the Constitution. Marshall centered the power of judicial review
chiefly upon the perceived purpose of a written constitution as fun-
damental law, and that "[i] t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." 163
 Marshall justified
the exercise of the power on something very close to a fundamental
understanding of judicial power, linked more closely to the existence
of the written Constitution itself. But in another sense, Marbuty itself
supports Anastasof s specific result in that it establishes also the pref-
erence for written judicial opinions, so that the Court itself might
know how it has interpreted the Constitution in the past.
When I suggested at the outset that respect for precedent is mak-
ing something of a comeback, I did not mean to discount the intense
debates about respect for precedent in constitutional adjudication, 164
particularly those involving Roe v. Wade. But to focus upon the intense
debates surrounding precedent in constitutional law would be to miss
the implications of precedent in every sort of case that a court en-
counters—common law, administrative regulation, statutes, or consti-
tutional interpretation. One might question, for example, whether
the Supreme Court carried its burden of justification in the series of
cases following National League of Cities v. Usery. 165
 In only a nine-year
period, precedent was created, exceptions carved, and finally the
original holding was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.166 By contrast, more than one-half century passed
before Plessy v. Ferguson. was overruled. 167
 And in other circumstances,
the Supreme Court has also said it will affirm a line of precedent even
when it considers that precedent to he wrong. 168
 We have been con-
162 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137 (1803).
I" Id. at 177.
"14 See generally, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan„5ince Derisis And Constitutional. Adjudication,
88 CoLum. L. REV. 723 (1988).
In5 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
lfiS 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For a description of ihe cases in this series, see GERALD GUN-
TtIER & KATIILEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAVI . 207-11 (13111 ed. 1097).
167 See Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954), overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16a See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) ("As we
have said, however, it is unnecessary for its to address this issue because we agree Mai,
whether or not Runyon was correct as an initial matter. (here is no special jusiitication for
departing here from the rule of stare decisis.") (internal citations omitted). Palle son ad-
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cerned with this issue of stare decisis versus non-binding precedent
for centuries. The new element, and a radical departure from our
prior practice, has been the relatively recent court rules declaring cer-
tain court decisions not to be precedent at all.
While I have largely discussed the doctrine of precedent in the
context of common-law adjudication, Anastasoff was a case of statutory
interpretation. The doctrine of precedent is not restricted to areas of
judge-made common law but is also a feature in cases involving statu-
tory interpretation. Precedent is one of the primary ways in which
common-law systems are distinct from civil-law systems.' 69 We know
that federal courts are said not to have a general common law, but
that does not mean they are not common-law courts in their method.
These core elements of starting from precedent have been the same
whether the question is common law, or statutory or constitutional
interpretation. These core elements, I have argued, have been more
or less constant throughout our history and provide an independent
rationale for affirming the result in Anastasoff.
This discussion about core understandings of judicial power begs
a very important question which, by necessity, I can only touch upon
here. What about state courts? Is it unseemly to say that precedent is
an essential component of judicial power only for the federal courts,
and not also for state courts? Although Anastasoff is limited to federal
courts, some state constitutions are worded similarly to Article III in
that they extend judicial power to the courts of their state.'" States
have developed constitutional norms of judicial power, and judicial
power issues often arise in separation-of-powers concepts or in stand-
ing or advisory opinion contexts. State reception provisions may lend
support here. 171 One could argue that when states "received" the
common law, they received its methods as well, so that statutes or con-
stitutional provisions directing state courts to apply the common law
of England were also directing them to apply its doctrine of prece-
dressed an issue of statutory interpretation decided in Runyon TA McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976).
169 See BERMAN El' AL., supra note 9, at 469.
0" See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. of 1836, art. VI, § 1 (1873).
171 For example, North Carolina's 1778 "reception statute," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4—I
(1999), provides: "All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use
within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to,
or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this Slate and the form of gov-
ernment therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or
in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full
fi wee within this State."
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dent. The fundamental assumption of the non-citation rules in both
state and federal courts is that judges have the authority to determine
which of their decisions will be precedent for future cases and which
will not. Anastasoff flatly disagrees with this view.
There may be no compelling distinction between the general
point in Anastasoff and the practices of state courts. Whether state
courts might abrogate non-citation rules on matters of prudence and
policy, or on state constitutional grounds akin to Anastasoff, the issue
cannot be ignored. In California, in fact, the state legislature in its
2000 session considered a bill that would have required that all state
appeal opinions be valid as precedents. 172 Also in California, a lawsuit
against the State's Supreme Court challenged the court's practices of
non-published opinions.'" And finally, an American Bar Association
resolution urged all appeals courts to provide "at a minimum, rea-
soned explanations for their decisions." 174
The inquiry outlined here suggests that not only has the per-
ceived need for a theory of precedent changed over time, so have the
justifications for departing from precedent and overturning prior
rules. The experience of jurists only a few generations removed from
the Framers raises questions that are surely pertinent to how we now
view the Framers' understanding of judicial power. I have suggested
that these experiences provide another way to affirm the Anastasoff
court's view of Article III. In the end, Anastasoff greatest contribu-
tion is to link the debate over non-citation rules with the debate about
the nature of precedent. The opinion teaches that precedent matters
to one's theory of the law, of the judicial function, and of the compel-
ling force of history.
172 See Glaberson, supra note 7, at 4-4.
177 Ironically, the California Supreme Cowl 's decisiott in this case, denying the peti-
tion for review, is a "decision without published opinion." Sclimier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., No.
S087534,2000 Cal. LEXIS 44M (May 24, 2000).
174 Quoted in Gtaherson, supra now 7, at 4-4.
